I here present a history of science example to support Shaikh's theoretical view that a modern theory of capitalism should be based on a conception of real competition, not either perfect competition or imperfect competition.
Let's first consider an episode from the scientific history of astronomy and physics in which via the respective scientific works of Kepler and Newton the heliocentric (ie, sun-centred) model of our solar system was firmly established.
The heliocentric model of our solar system basically depicts the Sun at the centre of our solar system (and the universe too) with all the known planets at the time (Mercury, Venus, Earth, Mars, Jupiter and Saturn) orbiting it in, as it was initially understood by Copernicus at the time, circular motions. This particular heliocentric model of our solar system (the Copernican model) was taken to be a fairly accurate representation of our solar system, based on the best available astronomical data of the time - ie, the empirical evidence that best supported the construction of such a model of our solar system. It was consequently held to be a better and more accurate representation of our solar system than its predecessor in the Ptolemaic model which had the Earth at the centre of our solar system, with the Moon, the Sun and all the known planets of the time orbiting it in a combination of circular and epi-circular motions. This model, it needs noting, was too based on the best available astronomical data of the time. Furthermore, it was also held to be a fairly accurate representation of our solar system, despite it being an incorrect or false model in the end.
The scientific work of Galileo's concerning the four phases of Venus and the moons of Jupiter all initially helped to establish that the Sun, and not the Earth, was at the centre of our solar system, and consequently it provided further empirical support for the Copernican heliocentric model of our solar system. However, it was no clinching argument, as it left untouched the issue about the lack of a stellar parallax, which was considered crucial to any acceptance of the Copernican heliocentric model of our solar system.
At about the same time there was also another competing model of our solar system, the Tycho Brahe model which had the Earth at the centre of our solar system with both the Moon and Sun orbiting it, while all the known planets of the time orbited about the Sun. It was a hybrid model of our solar system, ie, a cross between the heliocentric and geocentric models of our solar system. It, importantly, was based on the most up-to-date astronomical data of the time. Consequently, it could not be easily rejected. It thus aimed to be, just like the other two models of our solar system, a fairly accurate representation of it.
Given my brief account so far of this episode from the scientific history of astronomy and physics, it's clear that all these scientists were trying to give as practicably possible a fairly accurate representation of our solar system. Thus, they were all trying to make their respective scientific models of our solar system match up as practicably possible with the real solar system itself.
Significantly, then, all these physical scientists were pursuing a realist approach to the scientific study of our solar system (and the universe, too). They all started with the astronomical-empirical data of our solar system (and beyond) to guide them in the theoretical construction of their respective models of our solar system. Consequently, their respective scientific models of our solar system, regardless of how accurate or inaccurate they eventually proved to be, were grounded in reality, ie, a real-world solar system (and universe too).
Now, let's briefly consider how both Kepler and Newton firmly established the 'heliocentric' model of our solar system, which contains some crucial adjustments to the original Copernican conception of it.
Firstly, based on the detailed and precise astronomical-empirical data of Tycho Brahe, Kepler established that the real motions of the planets around the Sun were elliptical, not circular as Copernicus thought. Secondly, Newton was able to causally explain not only why the Sun was at the centre (or, to be precise, at the near-centre) of our solar system but also why and how the planets, including the Earth and its moon, orbited about the Sun elliptically. He does this by the first two laws of motion and his universal law of gravitation. All the planets of our solar system orbit about its centre of mass, which is near the centre of the Sun, because of a gravitational force which causes them all to constantly fall towards it while constantly flying away from it. Thus, they are all kept in a perpetual elliptical orbit about the Sun. (The Sun itself is also, it should be noted, orbiting about the actual centre of the solar system - its centre of mass).
So, on the basis of the Keplerian-Newtonian account of our solar system, we came to have a fairly accurate representation of our solar system. This causal model of our solar system was not only more accurate than the Copernican one itself, in the ways just outlined, but also a refutation of both the Ptolemaic and Tycho Brahe models of our solar system. The Earth was not at the centre of our solar system, the Sun is.
It can be concluded, therefore, that the Keplerian-Newtonian account of our solar system was the culmination point of a realist approach to science. The aim of science, in this regard, is to get our theories and models to match up as practicably possible with the real world. And one of the consequences of this is that it allows science to make more accurate predictions about things (as noted in another blog post).
This would seem, on prima facie grounds, to be a plausible, rational and even common sense approach in science if one of the aims of science is to get at the truth of the matter.
But most of all notice that in this episode from the history of science, the starting point of science is the real world itself!
Now, as a thought-experiment, let's suppose there is another group of physical scientists who were not trying to actually construct a realistic model of our solar system. Instead, let's suppose they were all interested in developing a modelled solar system which was based on a Platonic view of a perfect solar system. (Let's call them the 'Platonists'.) Let's say that such a solar system would consist of a stationary Earth at the centre of a giant crystal sphere, studded with bright stars which all revolved around it in a 24 hour cycle. Let's also suppose, in this order, that the Moon, the Sun, and the planets Mercury, Venus, Mars, Jupiter and Saturn all orbited about the Earth in perfect circles. Additionally, let's suppose that all these 'heavenly bodies' (as they may be called) are perfect spheres in themselves, and are self-propelling due to some kind of 'internal combustion engine'. And finally, let's suppose that these 'heavenly bodies' all orbit the Earth at a perfect speed and in perfect time so they don't cause any invisible ripples which will disrupt and/or displace the Earth's position at the centre of the solar system (and the universe too).
This then is a theoretical model of a perfect solar system (and universe too), as everything is in balance. It is one which is constructed independently of any astronomical-empirical data. It is, in short, a non-realist or an idealist conception of a solar system (and universe too).
In addition, this model of a perfect solar system (and universe too) is subsequently used to determine whether the real solar system (and universe too) is either a perfect replication of it or an imperfect replication of it. This particular model of a perfect solar system (and universe too) is the model of a solar system (and universe too).
Now, armed with this model of a perfect solar system, these Platonist scientists turn to the actual solar system itself (and the universe as well). What do they find? Well, based on all the available astronomical-empirical data assembled and provided by the above-mentioned scientific realists (especially Kepler and Newton), they find that the Earth is not at the centre of our solar system (and universe) but the Sun instead! (Just to be clear here, the Sun of course is not really at the centre of the universe, but it is as far as these Platonists are concerned.) Furthermore, they find that all the planets, the Earth with its moon included, orbit about the Sun in ellipses of various astronomical shapes (some, like the Earth's, is nearer to a circular motion while Mercury's motion is very elliptical as well as never returning to the same point in its precession). Additionally, they find that the planets are not self-propelling in the way they conceive them to be, but are in fact kept in their orbits about the Sun due to a gravitational force acting between them and the Sun. Met with the reality of the situation, how do they respond to it? That is, how do they explain the divergence between their model of a perfect solar system (and universe) and the actual solar system itself (and universe too)? They claim, on the basis of their own ideal model of a prefect solar system (and universe), that the reason why the actual solar system (and universe) fails to be a perfect replica of their own ideal model is because of certain types of 'invisible ripples'. These 'invisible ripples' have interfered, according to them, with the running and order of what would otherwise be a perfect solar system (and universe). They are what cause, in particular, for the Earth and its moon to be displaced from the centre of the solar system (and universe) and to be consequently replaced by the Sun itself. These so-called invisible ripples are held to be 'astronomical imperfections' of the solar system (and universe). Thus, for them, the principle reason for why the actual solar system (and universe) fails to be an exact replica of the one depicted in their ideal model of a perfect solar system (and universe) is because it's full of certain types of astronomical imperfections. Accordingly, for them, if these particular types of astronomical imperfections were removed, then the actual solar system (and universe) would match up with their ideal model of a perfect solar system (and universe).
Let's also imagine another group of physical scientists, who go by the name of 'Aristotelians', since they are interested in developing a more realistic model of our solar system (and universe) than these Platonist scientists are. However, as their theoretical reference point, they do not take the Keplerian-Newtonian realist model; instead, they take the idealist or perfectionist model of the Platonists. So, briefly, what they find is that: (1) the actual solar system (and universe) is nothing like the perfect one of the Platonists, and (2) this is because in the real world there are in fact certain types of astronomical imperfections which prevent our actual solar system (and universe) from ever being anything like the ideal or perfect model of the Platonists. Their slogan, so to speak, is: The real world is an imperfect, not a perfect, one. That's life! That's reality! Get on with it, as best you can! So, for them, the 'real' in the sense of what they observe around them is something that's imperfect while for the Platonists the 'real' in the sense of their ideal conception of things is something that's perfect.
Now, in light of the real history of our scientific investigations of our solar system (and universe), how do these two hypothetical perspectives of the Platonists and Aristotelians hold up? On prima facie grounds, they do not. If it's been revealed by science that this is how our solar system (and universe) actually looks like and fundamentally works, that should be the end of the matter. This is primarily because such a scientific realist account of our solar system (and universe) basically matches up with the reality of things. Why would you want to impose (as the Platonists do) a make-believe theoretical framework which clearly doesn't fit the reality of things? That's just a theoretical imposition! Equally, why would you want to use (as the Aristotelians do) such an impositional make-believe framework to help you say that the real-world of things is simply imperfect? To deny or ignore the scientific realist approach here is simply to engage in an irrational, implausible and even a non-commonsense approach to the scientific study of the real world of things.
One more thing, with respect to the Aristotelian/imperfectionist stance about science: if they want to say their account of our solar system (and universe) is a more realistic one than the Platonists' model of it, why not just frame it in terms of the only viable account that we have of our solar system (and universe) in the first place? Why give credence to a patently obvious implausible approach to science and an imaginary theoretical picture of our solar system (and universe)? It simply leaves us hanging on to a picture of something that doesn't exist. It also leads to the drawing of a somewhat still inaccurate representation of our solar system (and universe) in the sense that it asserts that there are in fact 'astronomical imperfections', when according to the scientific realist picture of the Keplerian-Newtonian account there aren't any because they simply don't exist - and, anyway, it's non-sensical to talk theoretically in that way.
In the end, we can conclude (to put it in Shaikh's terms): there is just the real world - there is no perfect or imperfect worlds! It should be plain obvious, then, that you should always start, in science, with the real world of things, not some non-real or imaginary world of things. This is by the way a very empiricist point about knowledge: the basis of both commonsense and scientific knowledge is, as both John Locke and David Hume would say, the world of empirical observation. Also, it's Marx shared point with regards to science.
Thus, when it comes to the task of investigating modern capitalism along scientific lines and developing a scientific theory about it, then one should start with, as Shaikh does, a conception of real competition and not some sort of competing conceptions over perfect and imperfect competition. This is the scientific realist approach. It's the only one that makes plausible sense!
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